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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of 
the Utah Industrial Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal for review of an Order of the Utah 
Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows: 
i. Whether or not the Industrial Commission 
committed error by failing to construe the 
workers' compensation statute liberally in 
favor of the applicant. 
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ii. Is the Industrial Commission's decision and 
order supported by adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. 
iii. Whether or not the Industrial Commission erred 
in finding that the Applicant's medical 
condition was not work related. 
iv. Whether the petitioner's due process rights 
have been denied by virtue of the Commission 
taking too long to make it's findings of fact. 
v. Whether the petitioner's due process rights 
have been denied by virtue of the Commission's 
Findings of Fact or if they are arbitrarily 
capricious or wholly without cause. 
vi. Whether the Industrial Commission applied the 
proper standard of review when entertaining 
Applicant's Motion for Review. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 states as follows: 
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule 
permitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or 
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agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and 
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding 
is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved 
parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or 
review. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 states as follows: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only iff on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 
by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-17 states as follows: 
(l)(a) In either the review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings by the district court or the review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may 
award damages or compensation only to the extent expressly 
authorized by statute. 
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(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency 
action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further 
proceedings. 
(2) Decisions of petitions for judicial review of final 
agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized 
by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 states as follows: 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or 
annul any order of the commission, or to suspend or delay the 
operation or execution of any order. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 states as follows: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and 
the dependents of each such employee who is liked, by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever 
such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-
inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 states, in part as follows: 
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial 
accident in the service of his employer fails to give written 
notice within 180 calendar days to his employer or the 
commission of the time and place where the accident and injury 
occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, the 
employee's claim for benefits under this chapter is wholly 
barred. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On July 15, 1991, the Petitioner asserts she was injured on 
the job while in the course and scope of her employment. On 
December 31, 1991, the Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing 
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for her Industrial Accident claim with the Industrial Commission. 
The petitioner was claimed that her on-the-job activities, 
including washing dishesf lifting trays and an increased workload 
led to an injury to her shoulder. Defendant responded that 
Petitioner's medical condition is directly attributable to a pre-
existing condition and not attributable to an industrial accident 
or disease. 
A hearing was held on June 12, 1992. After hearing testimony 
and receiving a medical exhibit, the Administrative Law Judge 
(hereinafter ALJ) took the matter under advisement. Several 
letters were sent to the ALJ requesting a decision. On November 
20, 1992, (or 162 days post hearing) the Administrative Law Judge 
entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The 
ALJ found that applicant had problems with her right arm and 
shoulder. That applicant knew the workers compensation system very 
well having prior industrially related injuries, ie cut finger and 
back. That the applicant was released to return to work on 
November 4, 1991. That applicant admitted she told her supervisor 
that she suffered from arthritis. The ALJ found that the applicant 
and her witnesses were not credible witnesses and that the defense 
witnesses were more credible. The ALJ found that there is no 
connection between the applicant's shoulder problem and the alleged 
industrial accident. 
The applicant filed a Motion for Review and Request for 
Hearing on December 21, 1992. The Industrial Commission entered 
it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicating there is 
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substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings on 
credibility. That there is evidence that applicant complained of 
shoulder and arm pain on July 15, 1991 and left work to seek 
medical attention. That the applicant suffered symptoms prior to 
the alleged incident of July 15, 1991. That the incident was not 
immediately reported to the employer and that applicant's treating 
physician attributed her complaints to a recurrent condition for 
which she sought treatment. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Applicant asserts she is entitled to workers compensation 
benefits for having suffered an industrial injury on July 15, 1991 
while in the course and scope of her employment. Immediately 
following the incident, she confronted her supervisor, Greg Coburn, 
and indicated she needed medical attention. In the hearing, Mr. 
Coburn testified that she was in pain, that she was crying, and 
that she was on the job when she confronted him. See pages 123, 
130 of Transcript. Mr. Coburn further testified that the applicant 
needed immediate medical attention. 
Another witness and employee of defendant, Penny Manchester, 
also saw applicant in tears on the day of the accident and verified 
she needed medical treatment. An accident report regarding the 
industrial injury was filled out by a supervisor on July 15, 1991. 
See report. 
Applicant was immediately treated for her injury by Dr. David 
Curtis, a physician who is employed by Defendant. In his chart 
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note August 8, 1991, Dr. Curtis indicates that applicant reported 
that the injury was industrially related. Dr. Curtis did not fill 
out a Physicians Report of Injury even though he was apprised that 
the medical condition was industrially related. 
An arthrogram was performed after the injury and found that 
she had a torn rotator cuff. Surgery was performed 14 days 
following the injury and the findings showed "an obvious large tear 
of the rotator cuff". No prior medical report manifests a torn 
rotator cuff. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard for review 
when entering it's Findings of Factf Conclusions of Law and Order 
denying Motion for Review. Specifically, the Industrial Commission 
applied Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) which is the standard the 
Court of Appeals must use. The Industrial Commission must apply 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 for the Motion for Review. It indicates 
that the Industrial Commission order shall contain the following: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule 
permitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or 
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and 
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding 
is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved 
parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or 
review. 
9 
The Industrial Commission did not follow Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-12. It mis-applied the standard of review, by not entering 
proper Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law for each issue, by not 
indicating the proper disposition of the case, and by disregarding 
substantial evidence indicating a compensable accident. 
The Industrial Commission disregarded competent evidence in 
favor of unsubstantial contradictory evidence in finding that 
Applicant did not suffer a compensable injury. The Industrial 
Commission committed an error of law by when it placed too much 
emphasis on "credibility" when it should have construed the 
benefits in favor of compensability. McPhie v* Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
The Applicant was substantially prejudiced by the delay of a 
decision by the ALJ. The ALJ tended to use superfluous evidence 
and disregarded substantial evidence in Applicant's favor. The ALJ 
took an inordinate amount of time to decide the case, and then only 
after prodding by the applicant. Applicant's due process rights 
have been violated. She is entitled to an ALJ who is unbiased. 
Her due process rights have been violated when the ALJ's conduct 
prevented meaningful and impartial consideration of the evidence. 
Bunnell v. Industrial Commission, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). 
Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985). The 
Conclusions of Law are not supported by the facts. Neither the 
ALJ nor the Commission entered adequate Findings to base a 
meaningful review. Finally, the Commission and the ALJ did not 
construe the facts in favor of compensability. McPhie. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
PROPER STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard of review. 
The Industrial Commission relied on Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) 
when it indicated that" 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA"), an ALJ's findings of fact will be 
sustained if the findings are supported by 
"substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court." 
The Industrial Commission went on to say: 
In its discussion of review of agency fact 
finding, the court noted that it would "not 
substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonable conflicting views," even if the 
court may have reached a different conclusions 
had the matter come before them on de novo 
review. Citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. Appl. 1989). 
This case is identical to Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 
215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1993). In Ashcroft, like this case, the 
Industrial Commission employed the phrase "substantial evidence" 
when reviewing the ALJ's decision. The Court of Appeals found in 
Ashcroft that "This is not the correct standard". That in order to 
prove compensability, the standard of "preponderance of the 
evidence" must be used. Jd. at 50. 
There is a significant distinction between "preponderance of 
evidence" and "substantial evidence" and is not one of mere 
phraseology. Id.. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion". Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ct. 
App. 1989). The Ashcroft case was remanded back to the Industrial 
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Commission. This case should also be remanded as both Mrs. 
Featherstone and the Court of Appeals are "entitled to know that 
the proof was evaluated under the correct standard". Jd. at 51. 
THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
An administrative agency must make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit 
meaningful appellate review. Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18 (1991). The failure of an agency to make adequate 
findings of fact on material issues renders its findings "arbitrary 
and capricious". Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 300, 335 
(Utah App. 1990) cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). The Utah 
Supreme Court has clearly described the detail required in 
administrative findings in order to be considered adequate. See 
Adams at page 19. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the Industrial Commission merely summarized the 
medical records by stating that the injured employee "had a history 
of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991". That Dr. Green 
attributed the rotator cuff injury to the July 15, 1991 industrial 
incident. That Dr. Curtis made reference to "recurrent right 
shoulder pain" and "applicant believed her injury was associated to 
'more heavy work7". The Industrial Commission then summarized the 
testimony. Even though a summary may be helpful, the Adams court 
specified that "A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in this 
case therefore does not give a clear indication of the ALJ's or the 
Commission's view as to what in fact occurred. 
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CREDIBILITY 
Credibility has been a major source of concern at the 
Industrial Commission level. The Commission is now realizing that 
to merely decide a case based solely on credibility does not meet 
Constitutional muster. Ordinarily, the Commission and the 
reviewing Court accord great deference to the Administrative Law 
Judge. The policy of deference is predicated on the Judge's 
ability to personally observe the witness and evaluate first hand 
his or her demeanor. Although determination of a witness 
credibility is usually left to the discretion of the finder of 
fact, that discretion is not unlimited and can be abused. How easy 
it would be for an ALJ to summarily dismiss a case based solely on 
credibility knowing that the Commission or the Court of Appeals 
would have an impossible task of ruling otherwise. However, said 
abuse should be scrutinized carefully by this court. A judge is 
not at liberty, under the guise of passing upon credibility of a 
witness, to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point 
of view is it open to doubt. Witnesses 81 Am Jur 2d §1034. 
Moreover, there is no reason for a trier of fact to determine the 
credibility of the testimony of a party where it is not 
contradicted by direct evidence, or by any legitimate inferences 
from the evidence, and it is not opposed to the probabilities, or 
in its nature surprising or suspicious. 
In this case, the ALJ chose insignificant and often irrelevant 
facts to illustrate his preconceived belief that the Applicant and 
all her witnesses lacked credibility. The ALJ made the simple 
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finding that "Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the applicant is not a credible witness". The ALJ 
justifies his summarizing testimony that applicant told a 
supervisor that she had arthritis, that pain prevented her from 
working, that she applied for unemployment benefits, that she knew 
the workers compensation system well, that she had prior problems 
with her right arm and shoulder and that she chose to retire. The 
ALJ completely ignored testimony and facts that 1) there was an 
increased workload, 2) that applicant performed her duties well up 
to the date of the injury, 3) that her supervisor found her in 
intense and immediate pain, 4) that her supervisor indicated she 
needed immediate medical treatment and 5) there is now a torn 
rotator cuff when previously there was not. 
It should be realized that the industrial injury occurred 
close to one year previous. The Applicant has seen numerous 
doctors, underwent a battery of tests and was intimidated by her 
employer and employer's doctor. It is not remarkable, and in fact, 
is entirely natural and consistent that her memory may have some 
minor gaps. 
In Baker v. Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965) 
the Utah Supreme Court had its first occasion to comment directly 
on the use of credibility determinations in workers' compensation 
cases. In that case, the Industrial Commission had denied 
compensation, sustaining an Administrative Law Judge's denial of 
benefits on the basis of the Applicant's alleged lack of 
credibility. The Supreme Court in reversing, held in part as 
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follows: 
We believe that the Commission as a fact 
finder acted as it did because apparently it 
disbelieved uncontroverted testimony of 
witnesses whose interest was in no way shown 
or inferablef which carried a reasonable 
measure of conviction, and there was noting in 
the record which intrinsically would discredit 
the testimony or be indicative of witness 
demeanor that would give the Commission an 
advantage over the Court in its determination. 
The Commission's Order recited testimony of 
the Applicant which seems to be taken out of 
contextf without considering the record as a 
whole. 
We think that the critical question here is 
whether the Commission arbitrarily can 
discount all competentf uncontradicted 
evidence. We think it can't, but did so here, 
calling for reversal. 
There is no lack of evidence or anything in 
the record to reflect incredibility on the 
part of the Applicant or her witnesses, 
unless, on uncontroverted testimony we 
arbitrarily say six persons, under penalty of 
perjury, were all prevaricators. 
The Baker Court noted that the purpose of the Industrial 
Compensation Act was to alleviate hardships upon workers and their 
families, and that the facts and inferences therefrom constituting 
a worker's right to recover are to be liberally construed and went 
on to hold that allegations of incredibility "must at least be 
supported by the record and by accurate findings of fact". 615. 
See also McPhie. 
PRIOR INJURIES 
The ALJ indicated that the applicant had a previous history of 
injuries. This is undisputed and was fully divulged by the 
Applicant. In order to recover workers compensation benefits, an 
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employee must prove that she was injured "by accident arising out 
of or in the course of employment" Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45. There 
are two prerequisites for a finding of a compensable injury 1) The 
injury must be "by accident" and 2) there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the employment. Nvrehn v. 
Industrial Commission, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (1990). The mere fact 
that an applicant has a pre-existing condition does not prevent 
that applicant from recovering benefits. The cases are clear that 
"The aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986) at 25. The key question is 
whether given this body and this exertion, the exertion in fact 
contributed to the injury. The Commission must make detailed 
analysis as to legal and medical causation. None of this was ever 
done by the Commission and this matter should be remanded back to 
the Commission for appropriate findings. In Nyrehn, like in this 
case, the Court of Appeals found that: 
The factual findings of the Commission are silent as to 
whether Nyrehn's preexisting back condition contributed 
to the industrial injury. The ALJ had merely concluded 
as a matter of law that 'since Ms. Nyrehn brought a 
preexisting low back condition to the workplace,' the 
Allen test applied. Implicit in such a legal conclusion 
is the critical factual finding that Nyrehn's preexisitng 
condition contributed to her injury. Such material 
findings, however, may not be implied. In order for us 
to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, 
the findings must be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. Id at 55. 
TIMELY REPORTING 
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The legislature has indicated what is needed when reporting an 
injury. In Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99, it indicates what is necessary 
to notify the employer. The employee must notify within 180 days 
of the injury. The employer then has the obligation to notify the 
Industrial Commission. The employee can also notify her doctor. 
The doctor then notifies the Industrial Commission. You will note 
that neither the employer, nor the doctor notified the Industrial 
Commission appropriately. In this case, the supervisor was 
immediately apprised of the injury when he personally witnessed the 
applicant in tears and that she need medical treatment. A 
supervisor filled out the report on that day. Another supervisor 
filled out another report within 54 days of the date of accident. 
Just because the ALJ chose to accept the last supervisor as the 
reporting incident cannot bar a claim. 
NO WITNESSES 
An injured worker does not always have the privilege to have 
someone witness an accident. The mere fact that an injury is 
unwitnessed does not mean it is not compensable. Moreover, there 
is medical verification by her employer that she was injured. All 
witnesses indicated that they noticed Applicant crying and in need 
of medical attention while she was on the job. 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
In Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. (1991) the 
Court of Appeals found that "An administrative agency must make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately 
detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review". The Court 
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then cited Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 
1990) when it stated: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the 
findings of the Commission, the findings must 
be "sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusions on each factual 
issue was reached. The failure of an agency 
to make adequate findings of fact on material 
issues renders it findings "arbitrary and 
capricious". 
There are two facets to determine whether there is a 
compensable injury. The first is medical causation. Renowned Dr. 
Green indicated that her medical condition is related to her 
employment. Dr. Curtis, the defendant's employee, indicates that 
applicant attributes her condition to increase workload. The 
second facet is legal causation. Neither the ALJ nor the 
Commission analyzed this aspect in any depth. The failure to make 
adequate findings renders the decision arbitrary and capricious. 
Nyrehn. The Court of Appeals cannot review the record 
meaningfully. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should remand this matter back to the 
Industrial Commission for further hearing. 
Dated this day of July, 1#93. / / 
'•IX 
DkviS W. Parker 
Attorney for Appellant 
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